Based on findings in the behavioral economics literature, we incorporate non-unitary discounting into a monetary search model to study optimal monetary policy. We apply non-unitary discounting, that is, discount rates that are different across goods. With this extension to the model, we find that there are cases where optimal monetary policy deviates from the Friedman rule.
discounting. Since non-unitary discounting exists and affects the optimal policy, it is important that we also study optimal monetary policy using a monetary search model with non-unitary discounting.
For this study, we incorporate non-unitary discounting into LW's framework. It has the following property. Each period is divided into two subperiods, day and night. In the day subperiod, the decentralized market (hereafter DM) is open and agents have to search for their partner to trade. They then use money to succeed in the trade because there exists the possibility of a single coincidence of wants. In the night subperiod, the market (hereafter we call the market a centralized market, CM), which is perfectly competitive, is opened. In this market, the agent can choose both the consumption and the production volume freely. In our study, we assume, for simplicity, that the DM is also competitive and that money is used to buy the goods as in Berentsen et al. (2007) 1 . Moreover, we add the assumption that the discount rates for the utility of consumption and disutility of production in each subperiod are different in this framework.
Using this extension to the model, we show that the Friedman (1969) rule is not optimal in the following two cases. The first case is when the discount rate for the utility of the consumption of goods traded in the DM (hereafter DM goods) is sufficiently low. The money demand is higher than in the unitary discounting case because the agents want to consume more during the next day subperiod because of the low discount rate of the DM goods. In this case, the consumption of the DM goods is higher than the optimal one. Since the high inflation rate decreases the money demand and the consumption of the DM goods, it improves welfare and the Friedman rule is not optimal. The second case is when the discount rate of the disutility from producing the DM goods is low. In this case, the agents produce the DM goods more so that they can work less in the future. However, if they do so, they excessively supply the DM goods. In this case, weakening the incentive for production by raising the inflation rate can improve welfare. Hiraguchi (2018) is similar to our study; however, he incorporates temptation preference whereby the agents have a desire to spend all their money and experience disutility from suppressing that desire. This factor differentiates his model from ours. Hori and Futagami (2018) also study the monetary economy with non-unitary discounting. However, they assume that households face a cash-in-advance constraint. Our model has a finer micro-foundation for money demand than their model. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides our model. Section 
Model
Our model's setting is close to Berentsen et al. s (2007) without banks. Time is discrete and runs from t = 0 to ∞. There exists a continuum of infinitely lived agents with a unit measure. Each period is divided into two subperiods, day and night. In the day subperiod, the agent becomes a "seller" who produces the goods with probability n ∈ (0, 1) and a "buyer" who consumes it with probability 1 − n. The instant utility is given by:
where u(q) is the utility from consuming q units of the goods and c(q) is the cost of producing 
is positive and has upper boundh. The labor productivity in the night subperiod is 1. Since buyers and sellers are anonymous, money is used to facilitate trade in the DM. Money is divisible and storable but intrinsically useless. M t denotes the amount of money issued before period t, and the growth rate of money is γ − 1. Therefore, M t+1 /M t = γ. Money is issued in the night subperiod, and all money is transferred to individuals equally. When we define T as the transfer of money to individuals, we obtain T t = (γ − 1)M t .
In the remainder of this section, we explain the features of our model that differ from Berentsen et al. (2007) . We assume that the discount rates for the (dis)utility of consumption and production are different. Therefore, lifetime utility is given by:
where β bd denotes the discount factor of u(q b ), β ds denotes the discount factor of c(q s ), β cb denotes the discount factor of U (x), and β cs denotes the discount factor of h.
Individual's optimization and the equilibrium
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two states associated with an agent: a seller and a buyer. In this section, we seek the optimal behavior in each state. Before we discuss optimal behavior, we mention notations. We omit the subscript t, which represents added variables, except for the case where we need the subscript. Moreover, we add the variable in the next period to +1, for example, z +1 .
First, we seek the seller's optimal behavior. The individual who becomes a seller in period t can obtain money and experiences disutility, c(q s ) in the day subperiod. That agent also experiences net utility, U (x) − h, in the night subperiod. Therefore, the seller's value function, which she maximized, is given by:
where
V (m) is the value that is obtained from future consumption and production. Each element,
, denotes the sum of the expected discounted present value of consuming and producing goods in the future day subperiod, and consuming and supplyng labor in the future night subperiod, respectively. These are given by:
where E is the expectation operator. The seller's budget constraint in the night subperiod is given by:
where ϕ is the real price of money and p is the nominal price of the goods in the day subperiod.
Substituting (9) into (3), we obtain:
As in Berentsen et al. (2007) , the seller treats p as given. Assuming an interior solution for h, the optimality condition of (10) is given by:
Let x * denote the value of satisfying (12). Moreover, we assume that U (x * ) > x * is satisfied for
x * to have a positive value.
Next, we seek the buyer's optimal behavior. Since buyers and sellers are anonymous, buyers hold money before they consume. Therefore, buyers face the following constraint:
Using a similar calculation to the seller's problem, we obtain the value function, which the buyer maximizes, as follows:
From (15), the optimal conditions of the buyer are the same as (12) and (13). We also find that the optimal consumption in the DM satisfies u ′ (q b ) ≥ ϕp. Since (11) is satisfied in the equilibrium, u ′ (q b ) c ′ (q s ) ≥ 1. Since we have acquired the seller's and buyer's solution, we can also obtain V (m +1 ). From (11) to (13), q s , x and m +1 do not depend on m. Therefore, (4) is rewritten as follows:
where constant term is the term that does not depend on m +1 2 . Substituting this equation into the last term of (10) and (15), we obtain:
We can show that in the equilibrium, (14) is binding, as in LW 3 . Therefore, we obtain the optimality condition of (18) as follows:
Since (11) is satisfied in the equilibrium, we have substituted (19) into (11).
We mention the Friedman rule. If (14) is not binding, β cs ϕ +1 = ϕ is satisfied in the equilibrium. This condition means that the cost of holding money is zero. Since ϕ ϕ +1 − 1 denotes the inflation rate, ϕ ϕ +1 = γ in the steady state. Using these two conditions, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The Friedman rule in this economy is that γ → β cs .
We provide the market equilibrium conditions. The market equilibrium condition in the DM is given by q s = 1−n n q b . The money market equilibrium condition is given by m = M . Therefore, m +1 = (1 + π)M = M + T . The aggregate labor supply in the CM is given by nh s + (1 − n) 
where h s and h b is the labor supply of the seller and buyer. Using other market equilibrium conditions, we get nh s + (1 − n)h b = x. This implies that the CM goods market also clears.
Policy analysis
In this section, we analyze monetary policy in the steady state. We consider a one-shot policy, which does not change forever. We define V 0 (m) ≡ (1−n)V b 0 (m)+nV s 0 (m) as a welfare function.
This definition is natural because agents in each period face the problem (10) and (15), and maximizing this function is the same as maximizing the expected value of the lifetime utility, (2) . Calculated as in Appendix C, we then obtain the welfare function in the steady state as 2 The derivation of (16) is provided in Appendix A. 3 See Appendix B.
6 follows:
whereq is the amount of the buyer's consumption in the steady state. Rewriting (19), in the steady state, we get
From (20) and (21), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The Friedman rule is not optimal if either case is satisfied:
and β db ≤ β cs .
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition for the first case of the proposition is the following. The higher β db implies that the agents demand more money for more future consumption. Then, the consumption of the DM goods is higher than the optimal one. Since a high inflation rate decreases money demand and consumption of the DM goods, it improves welfare. However, in the second case, the Friedman rule is not optimal although money demand is low. This is why excessive production occurs in the DM. Shown in Appendix D, this case happens when β ds is high. The value maximizing (20) ofq is given by:
This equation implies that the value maximizing (20) ofq is small if β ds is high. In other words, if β ds is high, excessive production tends to occur. In this case, weakening the incentive for production by raising the inflation rate can improve welfare.
Appendix

A The derivation of (16)
We add +2 to the variable after two periods, for example z +2 . If the agent in the current period becomes the buyer after two periods, then she gets the following discounted value:
.
The individual faces the same problem after two periods as the individual faces now, (10) and
(15). Therefore, future behavior, x +1 , m +2 and q s +1 , does not depend on m +1 . From this fact, we obtain:
where we have already substituted the budget constraint in the night subperiod. Using (A.2), we express (A.1) as follows:
In addition to the buyer, we obtain the value of the seller as follows: 
B Proof of binding (14) in the equilibrium
Suppose that β cs ϕ +1 > ϕ. Then, from (18), we find that the optimal behavior is m +1 = ∞.
Therefore, this case is not the equilibrium and β cs ϕ +1 ≤ ϕ in the equilibrium. When β cs ϕ +1 < ϕ, (14) is binding because the agents suffer losses if they hold more money than necessary. Therefore, we check if in the case where β cs ϕ +1 = ϕ, there is not equilibrium or (14) binds. In the case that v ′ (m +1 ) = 0 is satisfied. This occurs in the following two cases.
The first case is that ϕ +1 p +1 q * ≤ m +1 , where q * satisfies u ′ (q * ) = ϕp. In this case, the future self does not increase the consumption of the DM goods if m +1 increases, that is q ′ (m +1 ) = 0.
Therefore, v ′ (m +1 ) = 0. When we seek the left-hand limit of v ′ (m +1 ) at ϕ +1 p +1 q * , we get
is not the equilibrium, and the case where β cs ϕ +1 < ϕ is the only equilibrium. The second case is that m +1 = ϕpq * * , where q * * denotes the maximizing value of v(m +1 ). The agent does not have an incentive to increase the present holding of money because the increase will simply be used in the future. Therefore, (14) is binding in this case. By the above discussion, we showed that (14) is binding in the equilibrium.
C Derivation of (20)
We find that (5) , which is the expected future value, can be expressed as follows:
V db (m) = (1 − n)(u(q) + V db (m +1 )) + n(0 + V db (m +1 ))
where the first term is the value of becoming a buyer, and the second term is the value of becoming a seller, in the next period in the DM. From (C.1), we obtain the future value of V db (m) in the steady state as follows:
depend on m. Therefore, the bargaining problem is (u(q) − ϕz) θ (−c(q) + ϕz) 1−θ , (E.1)
where z ≡ pq and θ is the buyer's bargaining weight. Since this is the same as LW, the solution is given by:
Notice that g ′ (q) > 0 because there is the assumption of instant utility.
(16) does not change except n = 1/2. Therefore, we can rewrite (18) as follows:
From Appendix B, we find that z +1 = m +1 . Then, from (E.3), q ′ (m +1 ) = ϕ g ′ (q +1 ) . Using this equation, we obtain (19) in the case:
If θ → 1, g(q) = c(q). Then, (E.5) is the same as (19). In other words, if the price and quantity are determined by bargaining, we can obtain the same result in our paper.
